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AN EXAMINATION OF THE PURPOSES OF INVOLUNTARY
CIVIL COMMITMENT
JOHN Q. LA FOND*
Society is increasingly ambivalent about the propriety of coer-
cive intervention by the state in the lives of the mentally ill. 1 Liti-
gation concerning the standards and procedures for involuntary
civil commitment 2 and the scope of the state's authority following
commitment s has virtually exploded in the last two decades and
shows no sign of abating. This explosion has caused a re-examina-
tion of whether the state interests purportedly furthered by coer-
cive hospitalization of the mentally ill justify the loss of liberty and
other adverse consequences suffered by involuntary patients.
Recently many legislatures 4 and courts5 have limited coercive
* Professor of Law, University of Puget Sound, B.A. 1965, LL.B. 1968, Yale. The author
wishes gratefully to acknowledge the invaluable assistance of Professor Thomas J. Holdych,
a colleague, Professor Ernest J. Graham of the Psychology Department of the University of
Puget Sound, and Professor Herbert A. Morris, Professor of Law and Philosophy at the
University of California, Los Angeles.
1. See, e.g., Szasz, Theology of Therapy: the Breach of the First Amendment through
the Medicalization of Morals, 5 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 127 (1975); Chambers, Al-
ternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Practical Guides and Constitutional
Imperatives, 70 MICH. L. REv. 1107 (1972).
2. See, e.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and re-
manded, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), order on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (1974), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), order reinstated on remand, 413 F. Supp.
1318 (1976).
3. See, e.g., Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978) and Rogers v. Okin, 478 F.
Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), af'd in part and rev'd in part, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980),
vacated and remanded sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 50 U.S.L.W. 4676 (U.S. S. Ct. June 18,
1982).
4. ALA. CODE § 22-52-1, 10 (Supp. 1982); Am&Z. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-501, 520 (Supp.
1980); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5150 (West Supp. 1980); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-
176, 183 (West Supp. 1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 88-501 (Supp. 1981); HAwAn REV. STAT. §§
334-59, 60 (Supp. 1980); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 66-317, 329 (Supp. 1981); ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
91 /2, § 1-119 (Supp. 1980); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-14-9.1-1 (Burns Supp. 1981); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 229.11 (West Supp. 1980); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-2908, 2909 (Supp. 1980); Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. §§ 202A.030, .040 (Baldwin Supp. 1980), LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-2, 28-54
(West Supp. 1980); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 34, §§ 2332A, 2333 (Supp. 1981); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 59, §§ 12, 22 (1981), MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 12 (West Supp. 1980);
MICH. Cohip. LAws ANN. § 330.1401 (Supp. 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253A.04 (West Supp.
1980), MONT. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 53-21-102, 129 (Supp. 1979); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 83-1009,
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state intervention to police power commitment of mentally ill indi-
viduals who pose a threat of harm to themselves or others. In so
doing, they have prevented the state from exercising its traditional
parens patriae authority to care for those mentally ill persons una-
ble to act in their own best interest. Commentators have generally
approved of this emerging limitation on the state's commitment
authority and, thus, on the purposes which can properly be fur-
thered by such state action.
This article will examine the purposes sought to be served by
the involuntary commitment of the mentally ill. It will argue that:
(1) police power commitments based solely on dangerousness to
self or others should not be permitted unless predicated on a re-
cent dangerous act; and (2) commitments solely for a therapeutic
purpose should, under limited circumstances, be permitted.
1020, 1037 (Supp. 1978); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 433.194, 433A-170, 200 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 135-B: 19, 20 (Supp. 1978); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30: 4-23, 25, 26.3 (West Supp. 1979);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-10 (1979); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 9.37, 9.39, 9.41, 9.43 (McKin-
ney Supp. 1978); N.C. GEN STAT. §§ 122-58.2, 58.3 (Supp. 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 25-
03.1-02, 09 (Supp. 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 3 (West Supp. 1980); ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 426, 175 (Supp. 1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 7301, 7302, 7303 (Purdon Supp. 1981);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 27A-10-1 (Supp. 1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-604 (Supp. 1981);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-7-36 (Supp. 1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 7101, 7504 (Supp. 1981);
W. VA. CODE § 27-5-2 (Supp. 1981); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 51.15, 51.20 (West Supp. 1981);
Wyo. STAT. §§ 25-3-101, 110, 112 (1981). Many states define "gravely disabled" as an inabil-
ity to provide essential human needs such as food, clothing or shelter. See, e.g., CAL. WELF.
& INST. CODE § 5008(h) (Supp. 1980). Failure to provide these necessities will inevitably
cause serious physical harm to the individual making him dangerous to himself. This afore-
mentioned catalogue includes those states which define "gravely disabled" in this restrictive
manner or effectively require the state to establish the same functional facts.
5. See, e.g., Stamus v. Leonhart, 414 F. Supp. 439 (S.D. Iowa 1976); Bension v. Mere-
dith, 455 F. Supp. 662 (D.D.C. 1978); Suzuki v. Yuen, 438 F. Supp. 1106 (D. Haw. 1977),
modified, 617 F.2d 173, (1980); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974), rev'd,
651 F. 2d 387 (1981); Warren v. Harvey, 472 F. Supp. 1061 (D. Conn. 1979), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 902 (1980). These cases have generally held that parens patriae commitments vio-
late substantive due process or are unconstitutionally vague. See notes 77-97 infra and ac-
companying text.
6. See, e.g., Comment, Overt Dangerous Behavior as a Constitutional Requirement for
Involuntary Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 44 U. Cm. L. REV. 562 (1977) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Comment, Overt Dangerous Behavior], and DuBose, Of the Parens Patriae
Commitment Power and Drug Treatment of Schizophrenia: Do the Benefits to the Patient
Justify Involuntary Treatment?, 60 MINN. L. REV. 1149 (1976) [hereinafter cited as DuBose,
Parens Patriae Commitment].
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I. THEORIES OF INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT: A BRIEF OVERVIEW
A. Police Power Commitment
The state possesses authority under its police power to pre-
vent harm to the community.7 Thus, the legislature has wide lati-
tude to enact laws designed to protect the public health, safety and
welfare. Courts have traditionally given great deference to legisla-
tive judgments concerning the appropriate exercise of this power.,
The power of the state to confine mentally ill persons who
pose imminent danger to themselves or to third persons was estab-
lished early at common law.9 The common law has since been su-
perseded by statutory codification of the state's commitment
power. Currently, most states authorize temporary emergency com-
mitment of persons deemed mentally ill and dangerous to self or to
others.10 Some states permit non-judicial temporary commitment
7. The state in its sovereign capacity has authority to enact laws which will protect the
public health, safety, morals, and welfare. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusettes, 197 U.S. 11
(1905). In order to meet constitutional requirements, a state must exercise this authority to
further legitimate public interests by means which are rationally related to achieving that
purpose and which do not unduly intrude upon individual rights. When the state action
significantly intrudes upon fundamental liberties or creates a suspect classification the state
interest sought to be advanced must be compelling and the means used must be necessary
to achieve the objective. See Developments in the Law, Civil Commitment of the Mentally
Ill, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1190, 1223, 1224 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Developments-Civil
Commitment].
8. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955), Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365 (1926).
9. See S. Brakel & R. Rock, The Mentally Disabled and the Law, 34 (1971) and Devel-
opments-Civil Commitment, 1222-45. Commitment of a mentally ill person as dangerous
to himself because he may commit suicide, inflict serious physical damage on himself, or be
unable to sustain a basic life support system is considered to be an exercise primarily of the
state's police power to prevent harm to the community. It can also be considered to be an
exercise of the state's parens patriae authority since the state is implicitly acting on behalf
of a person incapable of seeking his own best interest.
10. Most states authorize temporary emergency commitment of persons determined to
be mentally ill and dangerous to others. See ALAsKA STAT. § 47.30.030 (Supp. 1979); ARiz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-526 (Supp. 1980); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 59-1406 (Supp. 1981); CAL. WELF.
& INST. CODE § 5150 (West Supp. 1980); COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-10-105 (Supp. 1980); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-183 (West Supp. 1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5122 (Supp. 1978);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.463 (West Supp. 1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 88-504.2 (Supp. 1981); HA-
WAHI REV. STAT. § 334-59 (Supp. 1980); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 66-326 (Supp. 1981); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 91 1/2, § 3-600 (Supp. 1981); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-14-9.1-7 (Burns Supp. 1981);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 229.22 (West Supp. 1980); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2908 (Supp. 1980); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 202A.040 (Baldwin Supp. 1980); LA. REV. STAT. § 28: 53 (Supp. 1981); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34, § 2332-A (Supp. 1981); MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 22 (Supp. 1981);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123, § 12 (West Supp. 1981); MIcH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 330.1427
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by order of a mental health professional" after the professional
has diagnosed an individual as suffering from mental illness and as
being dangerous to self or others.12 Some states additionally re-
quire the state to prove that the individual has committed a recent
overt act which manifests his dangerousness in a concrete man-
ner.1 A few courts have also imposed this requirement. 4 Not all
(Supp. 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253A.04 (West Supp. 1980); MIss. CODE ANN. § 41-21-71
(Supp. 1980); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 53-21-129 (1979); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 83-1020, 1021
(Supp. 1978); NEV. REV. STAT. § 433A.160 (Supp. 1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-B: 19
(Supp. 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30.4-26.3 (West Supp. 1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-10
(Supp. 1978); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.39 (Mckinney Supp. 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-
58.18 (1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.1-25 (Supp. 1979); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.10
(Page Supp. 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A § 52.1(B) (West Supp. 1980); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 426.175, .215 (1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 7301, 7302 (Purdon Supp. 1981); S.C. CODE
§ 44-17-410 (Supp. 1980); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 27A-10-3 (Supp. 1977); TENN. CODE ANN. §
33-603 (Supp. 1981); Tax. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-28 (Vernon Supp. 1980); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 64-7-34 (Supp. 1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 7504, 7505 (Supp. 1981); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.150 (Supp. 1981); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 51.15 (West Supp. 1981); Wyo.
STAT. § 25-3-110 (1977).
11. The term "mental health professional" as used in this article refers to any person
with training in the field of human behavior who is authorized by statute to commit or
recommend commitment of persons to mental health facilities. The term includes persons
with a wide range of competence and training in the mental health field. See, e.g., WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.020 (1975) which includes within the definition such diverse profes-
sionals as psychiatrists and persons holding a master's degree in social work.
12. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.467 (West Supp. 1980).
13. See ALA. CODE § 22-52-10 (Supp. 1979); GA. CODE § 88-501(v) (1981); HAWAII REV.
STAT. § 334-1 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 66-317(1) (1981); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 330.1401 (West
Supp. 1980); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-102(14) (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1009 (Supp.
1978); NEV. REV. STAT. § 433.194 (Supp. 1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 135-B: 19, 20
(1979); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 9.37, 9.39 (McKinney 1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 122-58.2,
58.3 (Supp. 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 25-03.1-02(11), 25-03.1-09 (Supp. 1979); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 5122.01(B), 10, 11 (Supp. 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 3(o) (West Supp.
1980); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7301 (Purdon Supp. 1981); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 33-603, 604
(Supp. 1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 7101(17) (Supp. 1981); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 51.15,
51.20 (West Supp. 1981). As of 1980 only eighteen states require the state to prove that the
individual has committed a recent act manifesting dangerousness or has threatened to do so,
thereby creating a reasonable apprehension of such act being committed.
14. Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974), rev'd, 651 F.2d 387 (5th Cir.
1981); Suzuki v. Yuen, 438 F. Supp. 1106 (D. Haw. 1977), modified, 617 F.2d 173 (9th Cir.
1980); Doremus v. Farrel, 407 F. Supp. 509 (D. Nev. 1975); Warren v. Harvey, 472 F. Supp.
1061, 1069 (D. Conn. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 902 (1980), Colyar v. Third Judicial Dist.
Court, 469 F. Supp. 424 (D. Utah 1979). But see United States ex rel. Mathew v. Nelson,
461 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. IM. 1978); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972),
vacated and remanded, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), order on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (1974),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), order reinstated on remand,
413 F. Supp. 1318 (1976). For an excellent analysis of the merits of requiring recent overt
behavior that manifests dangerousness, see Comment, Overt Dangerous Behavior supra
note 6.
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courts limit the concept of dangerousness to probable conduct
which will seriously harm the individual or other persons. Indeed,
the range of behavior over which courts have permitted the state
to assert its police power is quite broad, ranging from the seriously
harmful15 to the almost mundane."6
In theory, a person committed pursuant to the police power of
the state can be confined against his will until he is no longer dan-
gerous to others or to himself.17 A few courts have recently indi-
cated that a person committed as mentally ill and dangerous to
others or to self is entitled to treatment designed to alleviate his
condition, but it is unlikely that this view will be accepted as the
majority view.' 8
15. See, e.g., Goldy v. Beal, 429 F. Supp. 640 (M.D. Pa. 1976) (The court, in a stay
order, established attempted suicide as one possible criterion for involuntary commitment.).
A statuatory provision for involuntary commitment including this criterion was enacted in
1976. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7301 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
16. In People v. Williams, 47 IlM. App. 3d 861, 869, 365 N.E.2d 404, 411 (1977), the court
seemingly included within the definition of dangerous a mentally ill person who would be
unable to "function within the community, rent an apartment, or hold a job."
17. Perhaps the classic statement of the inherent limitation on the state's power to
confine is contained in the frequently cited case of In re Oakes, 8 Law Rep. 122 (Mass.
1845):
[T]he right to restrain an insane person of his liberty is found in that great law
of humanity which makes it necessary to confine those whose going at large
would be dangerous to themselves or others . . .. And the necessity which cre-
ates the law creates the limitation of the law. The question must then arise in
each particular case whether a patient's own safety, or that of others, require
that he should be restrained for a certain time, and whether restraint is neces-
sary for his restoration or will be conducive thereto. The restraint can continue
as long as the necessity continues. This is the limitation and the proper
limitation.
Id.
18. People v. Sansone, 18 IMI. App. 3d 315, 309 N.E.2d 733 (1974), leave to appeal de-
nied, 56 M1. 2d 584; People v. Sharkey, 60 M1. App. 3d 257, 376 N.E.2d 464, in accord is In re
Ottolini, 73 Ill. App. 3d 971, 392 N.E.2d 736 (1979). Another court has concluded that a
dangerous person whose mental illness is not amenable to treatment can be committed even
though no treatment will be available provided that, should treatment subsequently become
available, it will be afforded to such a person. Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala.
1974), rev'd, 651 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1981). In Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), the
Court intimated that treatment for such individuals might be required by the Constitution.
In striking down a California statute which made it a criminal offense to be addicted to the
use of narcotics, the Court said:
A state might impose criminal sanctions, for example against the unauthorized
manufacture, prescription, sale, purchase, or possession of narcotics within its
borders. In the interests of discouraging the violation of such laws, or in the
interest of the general health or welfare of its inhabitants, a state might estab-
lish a program of compulsory treatment for those addicted to narcotics. Such a
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B. Parens Patriae Commitment
Under its parens patriae power,19 the state is empowered to
act on behalf of mentally ill individuals who are incapable of pro-
tecting their own welfare. This power was recognized quite early in
English Common Law.20 Traditional legal devices for discharging
this power are readily found in the law.21 States have chosen to
exercise this commitment authority over a wide range of mental
disabilities. Most parens patriae statutory schemes typically au-
thorize involuntary commitment of persons who are mentally ill
and as a consequence of such illness are: unable to make responsi-
ble treatment decisions;22 gravely disabled;23 or unable to care for
their personal safety.
24
When a person has become mentally incapacitated to the ex-
tent that he is unable to make important decisions concerning his
program of treatment might require periods of involuntary confinement.
But see Speece, Preserving the Right to Treatment: A Critical Assessment and Construc-
tive Development of Constitutional Right to Treatment Theories, 20 Ariz. L. Rev. 1 (1978).
It appears likely that the state can constitutionally commit against their will mentally ill
persons who cannot provide the basic requirements of food, shelter and clothing by their
own efforts or with the assistance of friends even though successful treatment of these indi-
viduals is very unlikely. Thus, in some cases purely custodial confinement without a thera-
peutic objective is probably constitutional even though no effective treatment is medically
available. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (Burger, J., concurring). Com-
pare In re Oseing, 296 N.W.2d 797 (Iowa 1980).
19. Under its parens patriae authority, the sovereign, as the father of the country, acts
in the best interest of all persons who have lost the capacity to act in their own best inter-
ests. See Developments-Civil Commitment, supra note 7, at 1207-22.
20. For an excellent scholarly opinion reviewing the history of the parens patriae power
of the state in early English Common Law, see J. Neeley's opinion in State ex rel. Hawks v.
Lazaro, 202 S.E.2d 109 (W. Va. 1974). Judge Neeley expresses skepticism concerning whose
interest historically was really served under this authority. Id. at 118-19. Cf. Kendall v.
True, 391 F. Supp. 413 (W.D. Ky. 1975) (The court held that the state should not have the
unchecked power to commit involuntarily a person simply because he is mentally ill and has
reduced capacities for reasoning and making choices. Id. at 417-18).
21. For example, guardianships of property of an incompetent who can no longer act in
his own behalf is provided for by many states. See BRAKEL & RocK, supra note 9, at 273.
22. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5003 (Supp. 1978).
23. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5200 (West 1972); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-14-9.1-3 (Burns
Supp. 1979); NEv. REV. STAT. § 433.194 (1979); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 59-1404 (Supp. 1979). The
Arkansas definition of gravely disabled is typical. "Gravely disabled refers to a person who
is unable to provide for his or her own food, clothes, or shelter by reason of mental illness,
disease, or disorder." ARK. STAT. ANN. § 59-1401 (Supp. 1979).
24. Louisiana's statutory scheme authorizes involuntary commitment of an individual
if, as a result of mental illness, the person cannot "survive safely in freedom or protect
himself from serious harm . .. " LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28: 54 (West Supp. 1980).
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own welfare,25 some states would terminate that person's right to
liberty and his autonomous decision-making power and substitute
a third person's judgment (usually that of a state mental health
employee) for that of the mentally ill individual.2 Substitution of
one person's judgment for another's in deciding what environment
and treatment will best serve the individual's interest confers sub-
stantial discretionary power on the surrogate decison-maker. This
power frequently includes the authority to select the place in
which the disabled person is to live,27 what treatment, including
medication, the person is to receive," and, in certain situations,
what civil and other legal rights the individual may exercise.29
Emerging legal doctrines limit the scope of the substitute deci-
sion-maker's power to impose drastic treatment,30 to administer
25. There is controversy over whether a mentally ill person is truly unable to make a
responsible decision concerning his condition by selecting rationally from among available
alternatives. See Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, On the Justifications for Civil Commit-
ment, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 75, 88 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl,
On Justifications]. Some state statutes have set forth as criteria for commitment the inabil-
ity to make responsible treatment decisions. See note 22 supra. The potential for circular
reasoning in such a requirement is obvious since the refusal to accept treatment can be used
as conclusive evidence of irresponsibility, which in turn justifies coerced treatment. But see
text & accompanying notes 132-47 infra.
26. See text & accompanying notes 19-24 supra and Developments-Civil Commit-
ment, supra note 7, at 1210-11.
27. A court appointed guardian, for example, may determine where the person adjudg-
ed mentally incompetent shall live, as long as the choice is made in good faith and with the
welfare of the incompetent in mind. See In re Spengler, 282 Ill. App. 607 (1935); Roberts v.
Coffey, 198 Kan. 695, 426 P.2d 30 (1967); Grier v. Grier's Estate, 252 Minn. 143, 89 N.W.2.d
398 (1958); Kuphal v. Kuphal, 177 Misc. 255, 29 N.Y.S.2d 868 (1941); Wilson v. Bearden, 59
S.W.2d 214 (1933). The majority of state statutes do not explicitly confer such authority on
a guardian. Thus, it is generally governed by the common law.
28. But see WASH. Rsv. CODE ANN. § 71.05.370 (1975) which limits such authority by
conferring on involuntarily detained patients the right "In]ot to consent to the performance
of shock treatment or surgery, except emergency life-saving surgery, upon him, and not to
have shock treatment or non-emergency surgery in such circumstances unless ordered by a
court pursuant to a judicial hearing. ... ." Id. at § 71.05.370(7). The statute further pro-
vides that the patient has the right "[n]ot to have psychosurgery performed on him under
any circumstances." Id. at § 71.05.370(9). WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.05.360(2) (1975) pro-
vides that "[e]ach person involuntarily ... committed ... shall have the right to adequate
care and individualized treatment." Id. Thus, except for limitations on exceptionally intru-
sive treatment such as electroshock therapy or psychosurgery, broad treatment discretion is
generally accorded treatment personnel. But see notes 31 & 47 infra.
29. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.360 and § 71.05.370 (1974).
30. See, e.g., Kaimowitz v. Dept. of Mental Health Civil No. 73-19, 434-AW (Cir. Ct.
Wayne Co., Mich., July 10, 1973), reported in part in 2 Pris. L. Rep. 433 (1973) and 42 U.S.
L.W. 2064 (1973). The opinion is reproduced in A. BROoKS, LAW, PsYcHIATRY, AND THE
MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 902-24 (1974). The court refused to permit experimental psycho-
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anti-psychotic medication to a patient who refuses it, 1 to curtail
the exercise of civil or other legal rights3 2 or to restrict unnecessa-
rily the freedom of the individual. 3 These doctrines have generally
not challenged the fundamental right of the surrogate decision-
maker to act on behalf of the patient. They have simply limited
the scope of his authority.
II. EARLY CRITICISMS OF BOTH POLICE POWER AND PARENS
PATRIAE COMMITMENTS
Early criticisms of both police power and parens patriae com-
mitments focused primarily on the alleged failure of most state
commitment schemes to afford persons adequate procedural due
process." There was serious concern that the procedures employed
in commitment proceedings did not result in accurate fact-finding
and did not constitute appropriate adversarial decision-making.
Most courts have concluded that involuntary civil commitment de-
prives an individual of his liberty and that the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment therefore requires that procedures
employed to effect commitment must satisfy the fundamental re-
quirements of procedural due process.3 5 Over the last several de-
surgery to be performed on an involuntarily committed patient.
31. Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J.) and Rogers v, Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342
(D. Mass. 1979), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and
remanded sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 50 U.S.L.W. 4676 (U.S. S. Ct. June 18, 1982) (Involun-
tarily committed patients may refuse psychotropic medication in non-emergency
situations.).
32. The general rule is that a guardian may not exercise a purely personal elective right
of his ward. Howard v. Imes, 265 Ala. 298, 90 So. 2d 818 (1956); Hendricks v. Grant County
Bank, 379 P.2d 693 (Okla. 1963).
33. Perhaps the most clearly articulated doctrine imposing such a limitation is the
"least restrictive alternative" doctrine frequently imposed by courts. This doctrine requires
that the freedom of a mentally ill individual be restricted no more than is necessary to
achieve the purpose of the commitment. It can be grounded either in statute or in equal
protection and substantive due process theories mandated by the Constitution. See Lake v.
Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974),
rev'd, 651 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1981); Developments-Civil Commitment, supra note 7, at
1240-49 and Hoffman and Foust, Least Restrictive Treatment of the Mentally Ill: A Doc-
trine in Search of its Senses, 14 SAN D.L. REv. 1100 (1977).
34. See, e.g., Prochaska v. Brinegar 251 Iowa 834, 102 N.W.2d 870 (1960); Fhagen v.
Miller, 29 N.Y.2d 348, 278 N.E.2d 615 (1972); and Logan v. Arafeh, 346 F. Supp. 1265 (D.
Conn. 1972), afl'd sub nom. Briggs v. Arafeh, 411 U.S. 911 (1973).
35. See, e.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and re-
manded, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), order on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (1974), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), order reinstated on remand, 413 F. Supp
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cades, courts have consistently rejected the contention that since a
parens patriae commitment was for the benefit of the patient and
had a therapeutic objective, procedural due process was not re-
quired. 6 Supreme Court cases in analagous contexts persuaded
courts to reject this argument."'
In 1979 the Supreme Court, in Addington v. Texas, s
explicitly held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment is applicable to involuntary commitment proceedings
and that it requires states to establish the criteria for involuntary
civil commitment by proof that is "clear and convincing."39 It is
not the purpose of the commitment or the theory under which
the state seeks commitment that determines whether procedural
due process must be afforded; rather, it is the nature of the inter-
est affected-namely, the loss of liberty-that imposes the
requirement. 0
1318 (1976); Fhagen v. Miller, 29 N.Y.2d 348, 278 N.E.2d 615 (1972). Until 1979, the Su-
preme Court had not specifically considered whether the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment was applicable to state commitment action. It had, however, considered
it applicable to state action in analogous areas. See, e.g., McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Inst.,
407 U.S. 245 (1972) (holding procedural due process applicable to indeterminate commit-
ment of alleged defective delinquent) and In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1966) (procedural due
process applicable to juvenile commitment). In Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979), the
Supreme Court held specifically that procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment is applicable to state involuntary commitment, and that, accordingly, the "clear and
convincing" standard of proof must be used in such proceedings.
36. See, e.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp 1078, 1088 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and
remanded, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), order on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (1974), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), order reinstated on remand, 413 F. Supp.
1318 (1976).
37. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (procedural due process must be afforded
juveniles in delinquency proceedings, despite allegedly beneficient purposes of state action)
and Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967) (procedural safeguards are required when the
state seeks to commit a sexual offender to an indeterminate term).
38. 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979).
39. The specific question before the Court in Addington was "what standard of proof is
required by the Fourteenth Amendment in a civil proceeding brought under state law to
commit an individual involuntarily for an indefinite period to a state mental hospital." Id.
at 418.
40. In deciding which particular standard of proof is constitutionally required, the
Court in Addington assessed both the individual's interest in liberty and the state's inter-
ests in providing care to mentally ill citizens who cannot care for themselves and in protect-
ing the community. This balancing of interests was not necessary to decide whether proce-
dural due process is applicable in the first instance to involuntary commitment proceedings.
Rather, it was necessary to decide which party was to bear the risk of error in the fact-
finding process and, consequently, which standard of proof must, as a constitutional mini-
mum, be used. Seemingly, the Court requires the same standard of proof regardless of the
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However, the Court also noted that not all procedural safe-
guards available to criminal defendants need be accorded persons
being committed since there are differences between criminal pros-
ecutions and civil commitment. 41 Many state statutes governing in-
voluntary civil commitment currently provide that persons whom
the state seeks to commit must be afforded prior notice,'4 2 an op-
portunity to be heard, 43 the right to a judicial hearing,44 the right
to counsel,45 and the right to judicial review of an initial
commitment.
46
In concluding that procedural due process must be afforded in
commitment proceedings regardless of the type of authority being
asserted by the state, it can be argued that courts have in effect
legitimated the fundamental assumptions underlying involuntary
commitment; i.e., that the state may forcibly deprive a mentally ill
person of his liberty in order to prevent harm to the community or
himself, or to safeguard the welfare of the individual. 47 Increas-
ingly, courts are re-examining the legitimacy of the underlying
state objectives in involuntary civil commitments.'
Both kinds of commitments have also been criticized for alleg-
purpose or theory of the commitment.
41. In Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979), the Supreme Court concluded that
involuntary commitment differs from criminal prosecution because "in a civil commitment
state power is not exercised in a punitive sense." Id. at 428.
42. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE § 71.05.150 (1975) (which provides for serving a sum-
mons on a person whose commitment is being sought requiring that person to appear for an
examination but dispensing with such notice in emergency situations).
43. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-52-3 (Supp. 1979).
44. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE § 71.05.310 (providing for a jury trial if a commitment is
sought for any substantial period).
45. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE § 71.03.300. But see Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp.
1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), order on remand, 379 F.
Supp. 1376 (1974), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1974), order
reinstated on remand, 413 F. Supp. 318 (1976) and Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th
Cir. 1968).
46. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.060; ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-546 (Supp. 1969);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1482.
47. Procedural due process is concerned, in part, with insuring that facts are deter-
mined accurately. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). Thus, once the fact of mental illness
and resulting incapacity to act rationally on one's own behalf have been accurately deter-
mined, the legitimacy of the state's purpose in responding to the condition of the individual
as factually determined has been affirmed. In Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979), Jus-
tice Burger, in dicta, said that "[t]he state has a legitimate interest under its parens patriae
powers in providing care to its citizens who are unable because of emotional disorders to
care for themselves." Id. at 462.
48. See text & accompanying notes 56-57 & 82-100 infra.
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edly violating the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Essentially, the claim was that classifications based
on "mental illness" were "suspect" and, consequently, strict scru-
tiny of the state's objective was required.49 This argument has been
rejected by most courts.5 0 It is unlikely, moreover, that an equal
protection argument will prevail as long as mental illness is ac-
cepted by courts as a condition manifested by significant cognitive,
emotional or behavioral impairments which ought to have legal sig-
•nificance. 51 Thus, courts will probably find mental illness to be a
relevant personal characteristic for distinguishing among persons
in order to achieve legitimate state objectives. Otherwise, an appli-
cation of the equal protection clause might well preclude other
special legislation which affects only the class of individuals af-
49. See Comment, Wyatt v. Stickney and the Right of Civilly Committed Mental Pa-
tients to Adequate Treatment, 86 HAxv. L. REv. 1281, 1294 (1973); Comment, Mental Ill-
hess: A Suspect Classification; 83 Yale L.J. 1237 (1970). This argument also challenges the
constitutionality of police power commitments since such commitments also depend on a
finding of "mental illness." It is interesting to note how some critics of coercive civil com-
mitment are themselves inconsistent in their view of whether mental illness really exists.
Bruce Ennis, for example, seems to concede that many citizens recognize their own mental
illness and seek treatment from mental health professionals for their condition. See Hear-
ings on the Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill Before the Subcommittee on Consti-
tutional Rights, 91st Cong., 1st and 2d Seas. 273 (1969) (statement of Bruce J. Ennis). Sub-
sequently, however, Ennis has seemingly questioned the ability of mental health
professionals to diagnose mental illness accurately and consistently and, by implication, has
questioned the reality of mental illness. See Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presump-
tion of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALWF. L. Pav. 693, 711 (1974) [here-
inafter cited as Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and Expertise].
50. Equal protection analysis has always been more fruitful when urged as a basis for
requiring that persons acquitted of criminal charges by reason of insanity must, after a rea-
sonable period of detention, be processed in substantially the same manner as other persons
whose involuntary commitment is being sought. People v. McQuillan, 392 Mich. 511, 221
N.W.2d 569 (1974) and State v. Krol, 67 N.J. 432, 344 A.2d 289 (1975). But see Alter v.
Morris, 85 Wash. 2d 414, 536 P.2d 630 (1975) and United States v. Ecker, 543 F.2d 178
(D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063 (1977).
51. See generally T. SzAsz, THE MrH oF UTrAI ILLNESS (1969). Some legal commen-
tators argue that mental illness is a legal construct having no referent in medical terminol-
ogy. See, e.g., Hardisty, Mental Illness: A Legal Fiction, 48 WASH. L. REv. 735 (1973). But
see Weihofen, The Definition of Mental Illness, 21 Omo ST. L. J. 1 (1960). For excellent
analysis of this problem, see Shapiro, Therapeutic Justification for Intervention into
Mentation and Behavior, 13 DUQ. L. Rav. 673 (1975) and Moore, Some Myths about
Mental Illness, 32 ARCH. GEN. PSYCH. 1483 (1975). Michigan defines "mental illness" statu-
torily as "a substantial disorder of thought or mood which significantly impairs judgement,
behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or ability to cope with the ordinary demands of daily
life." MICH. Comp. STAT. ANN. § 330.1400a.
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flicted with mental illness.52
III. AN EXAMINATION OF POLICE POWER COMMITMENTS
A. Current Criticism of Police Power Commitments
Involuntary commitment of the mentally ill as dangerous to
self or others has been criticized more recently on different
grounds. Some critics have characterized such commitments as
preventive detention. 3 They claim that police power commitments'
effectuate a loss of liberty not to punish a harmful act already
committed by the individual but rather to prevent possible future
harm."4 There is also a serious question whether the individual by
his own deeds deserves the loss of liberty inflicted on him and,
thus, whether any semblance of distributive justice is in fact being
furthered.5
Though most courts have not accepted the argument,"' a
strong case can also be made that the standards under which such
commitments are made are unconstitutionally vague. Many state
statutes do not define "dangerousness" with any specificity.57 This
lack of specificity fails to provide adequate notice to individuals as
to what personal behavior will justify the state's assertion of the
commitment power. In addition, state officials are given extraord-
52. For example, the insanity and diminished capacity defenses in criminal law, testa-
mentary capacity in the law of trusts and estates and the capacity to enter into contracts in
contract doctrine are but a few of the legal doctrines which assume that mental illness exists
and that it can have an adverse impact on human behavior which ought to have legal conse-
quences. See Brakel & Rock, supra note 9.
53. Herman, Preventive Detention, a Scientific View of Man, and State Power, 1973
U. ILL. L.F. 673, 682 (1973). Dershowitz, Preventive Confinement: A Suggested Framework
for Constitutional Analysis, 51 TEx. L. REV. 1277, 1286 (1973).
54. Commentators have noted that the concept of "future harm" must be analyzed
more carefully. For example, Dershowitz has pointed out that not every possible harm might
justify commitment and, that, in addition, attention must be given to the probability that
harm will occur and the frequency with which it might occur. See also Millard v. Harris, 406
F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1968) in which Judge Bazelon also considered the extent of the harm to
the victim.
55. See generally H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968) and H.M. Hart,
The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 401 (1958).
56. See, e.g., Goldy v. Beal, 429 F. Supp. 640 (M.D. Pa. 1976). On the other hand, some
courts have invalidated involuntary commitment statutes for their failure to meet due pro-
cess requirements. See, e.g., Kendall v. True, 391 F. Supp 413 (W.D. Ky. 1975); Lynch v.
Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 390 (M.D. Ala. 1974), rev'd, 651 F.2d 387 (1981); Bell v. Wayne
County General Hospital at Eloise, 384 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
57. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-10-102(7) (Supp. 1980).
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inary discretion as to whom they may confine. Judicial review of
such state action is thereby rendered extremely difficult.
Commentators have noted that psychiatrists are extremely in-
accurate in predicting dangerous behavior. After reviewing empiri-
cal studies of psychiatric predictions of dangerous behavior, Ennis
and Litwack concluded that psychiatrists overpredicted dangerous
behavior by an extremely wide margin.5 8 Another commentator
concluded that the highest ratio of accurate predictions of danger-
ousness is only 35%; i.e., only 35 out of every 100 persons deter-
mined to be dangerous by mental health experts subsequently en-
gaged in explicitly dangerous behavior.59 The unfortunate but
inevitable conclusion which must be drawn from this data is that
the police power commitment authority permits the state to de-
prive many persons of their liberty who in fact do not pose any
danger to themselves or to the community. It thereby raises a seri-
ous substantive due process question, since the purpose of the
state in effecting such commitments-the prevention of harm to
58. In Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and Expertise, supra note 49, for example, the
authors cite the famous "Operation Baxstrom" studies which evaluated approximately 1000
prisoner-patients held in New York State Department of Correction hospitals as mentally ill
and dangerous who became eligible for release after their prison term had expired because
of the Supreme Court's decison in Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966). Follow-up stud-
ies indicate that only one percent (approximately) of these individuals could be considered
dangerous. Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and Expertise, supra note 49, at 712. Studies indi-
cating psychiatrists are poor predictors of dangerousness have been criticized on several
grounds, including measuring only subsequent violent acts that resulted in legal proceed-
ings, not taking into account treatment received by the subjects prior to release and using
sample populations composed of persons convicted of crime, many of whom were not men-
tally ill. See U.S. ex rel. Mathew v. Nelson, 461 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ill. 1978). Even though
the empirical evidence may be criticised for methodological deficiencies, almost all of the
evidence indicates the absence of expertise and the occurence of a large number of false
positives. A strong argument can be made that, since individual liberty is at stake, the state
should bear the burden of establishing the claimed expertise which purportedly establishes
the factual basis for the state action by proffering adequate empirical evidence before police
power commitments are permitted. The argument becomes even stronger once the prelimi-
nary empirical evidence negates the claimed expertise, thus casting the burden of produc-
tion and rebuttal on the state.
59. Comment, Overt Dangerous Behavior as a Constitutional Requirement for Invol-
untary Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 44 U. Cm. L. REv. 562, 583 (1977), citing
Kozol, Boucher & Ganofali, The Diagnosis and Treatment of Dangerousness, 18 J. CRIME &
DELINQUENCY 371 (1972). Compare Cocozza & Steadman, The Failure of Psychiatric Predic-
tions of Dangerousness: Clear and Convincing Evidence, 29 RUTGERS L. Rav. 1084 (1976);
Steadman, Some Evidence on the Inadequacy of the Concept and Determination of Dan-
gerousness in Law and Psychiatry, 1 J. PSYCH. & L. 409 (1973); Rubin, Prediction of Dan-
gerousness in Mentally Ill Criminals, 27 ARCH. GEN. PSYCH. 397 (1972).
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society or the committed individual-is most often not furthered
by a particular individual's commitment. Consequently, the means
adopted to achieve the state's purpose are open to criticism as be-
ing far broader than necessary.60
In addition to resulting in an inordinate number of mistakes, 1
police power commitments suffer from other serious deficiencies.
Under the rationale of police power commitments, a person can be
deprived of his liberty for as long as he is considered dangerous.
62
The duration of such a confinement is, consequently, indetermi-
nate. Moreover, it has not yet been determined whether a person
who is committed as mentally ill and dangerous to self or others is
constitutionally entitled to treatment.6 Absent some reasonable
prospect that treatment will be afforded such individuals so as re-
alistically to permit their timely release back into society, such
commitments effectuate a complete loss of liberty without confer-
ring any benefit on the individual6' and, at the same time, confine
60. In U.S. ex rel. Mathew v. Nelson, 461 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. II. 1978), the court im-
plicitly validated police power commitments even though available empirical evidence indi-
cated that in the aggregate most predictions of subsequent violent behavior were incorrect.
The court seemingly concluded that so long as there were some instances in which psychia-
trists, based on a clinical examination, could determine (successfully predict?) that a subject
"is reasonably expected to injure himself or another within a reasonable time" coercive con-
finement was proper. Id. at 711. The constitutionality of pervasive state action ought to be
assessed primarily on its typical impact on the broad class of citizens affected and not on
the unusual and exceptional instance. This is even more appropriate if there is strong indi-
cation that even stringent procedures and rigorous fact-finding will not compensate for the
absence of claimed expertise and, consequently, substantial error occurs. Compare Ennis &
Litwack, Psychiatry and Expertise, supra note 49.
61. Ennis & Litwack offer several possible explanations for such a wide range of mis-
taken judgements by psychiatrists. These include, for example, the orientation and training
of the medical model which induces error on the side of safety (i.e., finding illness rather
than finding no illness), the context of the diagnosis and prediction, and the personal bias of
the evaluator. Id. at 719-34.
62. In Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), the Supreme Court concluded that sub-
stantive due process required that a rule of reason apply to the length and conditions of
commitment. See note 117 infra. This analysis suggests that a mentally ill person who con-
tinues to be dangerous and is not treatable can be held indefinitely. See also note 17 supra.
63. Some courts have indicated that such individuals have a right to treatment. See,
e.g., People v. Sansone, 18 Ill. App. 3d 315, 309 N.E.2d 733 (1974) which seemingly
grounded the right in the state's Mental Health Code.
64. The "quid pro quo" theory would permit that state to involuntarily confine a per-
son with reduced procedural protection in exchange for conferring the benefit of treatment
on him. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit adopted this theory. On appeal, however,
it was rejected by the Supreme Court. See Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (1974),
vacated and remanded, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
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many individuals who in fact do not satisfy the commitment
criteria.6 5
Such commitments are not necessarily even a state response to
the present status or behavior of an individual.6 When a police
power commitment is effectuated without a showing of a recent
dangerous act, the state has responded not to a present demon-
strated harm based on the person's conduct but rather to contin-
gent future harm which may or may not occur.6 7 In effect, a person
loses his liberty not because of who he is now or what he did in the
past but because of who he might become or what he might do in
the future. Arguably, the state's purported purpose is far too spec-
ulative to be judicially recognized as "compelling" under the Four-
teenth Amendment.
B. Recommendations
Strong arguments can be made that police power commit-
ments of the mentally ill because they are dangerous to self or
others should be completely prohibited. These commitments raise
very serious constitutional concerns 8 and empirical evidence indi-
cates that in a vast majority of cases the compelling purpose prof-
fered by the state is not furthered.69 Furthermore, serious ques-
tions concerning the justice of these confinements remain.70
Nonetheless, it must be acknowledged that virtually every fed-
eral and state court. which has considered such challenges to the
basic validity of police power commitments has sustained this ex-
65. See text & accompanying notes 58-61 supra.
66. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) and notes 53-55 supra.
67. It is not unusual for psychiatrists to predict harm based on generalizations made
about a type of disease rather than the particular patient. Compare Hough v. U.S., 271 F.2d
458 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (Miller, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Absent some
specific conduct which manifests dangerousness, it is difficult to argue that a particular per-
son presents a clear and present danger or that he is even dangerous.
68. See text & accompanying notes 56-65 supra. Cf. U.S. ex rel. Mathew v. Nelson, 461
F. Supp. 707 (N.D. IMI. 1978) (The court, in refusing to require the state to prove that a
mentally ill person has committed a recent dangerous act before it could commit him under
its police power, stated that "the evidence relied on by plaintiffs in support of their position
indicates that there is a high degree of error in predicting dangerousness, regardless of
whether the subjects are mentally ill and regardless of whether the patient's history includes
a recent overt act. Plaintiffs, in view of their position as to the predictive or diagnostic
capacity of psychiatrists, might be expected to argue that no commitment based on danger-
ousness is permissible, but they do not go that far." Id. at 710.).
69. See text & accompanying notes 58-61 supra.
70. See text & accompanying notes 53-55 supra.
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ercise of state authority.7 1 And, though the Supreme Court has not
yet considered a case which explicitly raised the question of
whether such commitments are constitutional, the Court has inti-
mated that it would sustain the constitutionality of police power
commitments. 2 Since most states permit such commitments and
most courts have upheld the exercise of state power in this man-
ner, abolition of police power commitments seems highly unlikely.
Given this recent history, the most appropriate and realistic
recommendation that can be made in light of the telling criticisms
of police power commitments is that such commitments should
only be permitted upon a showing that the mentally ill individual
has committed a recent overt act clearly manifesting that he is
dangerous to himself or others.73 Such a requirement has several
advantages.
The fundamental authority of the state to act adversely to the
liberty interest of the individual would be established by the past
conduct of the individual himself and not by his present status or
contingent future behavior.7 4 The individual would at least have
71. See notes 55 and 56 supra.
72. See Donaldson v. O'Connor, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). In the opinion Justice Stewart, in
dicta, stated that "assuming that the term [mental illness] can be given a reasonably precise
content and that the mentally ill can be identified with reasonable accuracy, there is still no
constitutional basis for confining such a person involuntarily if they are dangerous to no one
and can live safely in freedom." Id. at 575.
73. The formulation of such a behavior requirement has varied. Alabama defines it as
follows: "That the threat of substantial harm has been evidenced by a recent overt act."
1975 ALA. AcrS 2566 (Act 1266, § 10). Michigan is less demanding: "A person who is men-
tally ill, and as a result of that mental illness can reasonably be expected within the near
future to intentionally or unintentionally seriously physically injure himself or another per-
son, and who has engaged in an act or acts or made significant threats that are substantially
supportive of the expectation." MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 330.1401(a). Serious consideration
should be given to defining the overt conduct requirement in terms substantially equivalent
to those used in the statutory definition of criminal attempt. This would preclude the state
from intervening until the actor has passed the threshold of criminal responsibility. Not
only would this protect conduct which by itself is not prohibited; it would also justify the
state's authority to interfere with the liberty interest of the individual since assumedly the
behavior would also justify the state's arresting the individual. Moreover, the act should
have occured within the "recent" past. Though it may be impracticable to set an arbitrary
time limit, the primary focus ought to be on recent behavior that is symptomatic of an on-
going mental illness. In U.S. ex rel. Mathew v. Nelson, 461 F. Supp. 707 (1978), the court
held that the state could commit mentally ill persons who were dangerous to themselves or
others without establishing that the individual committed a recent dangerous act. "Recent"
was defined as "meaning within the past year." Id. at 709, n.5. It should be the unusual case
in which such "stale" behavior would satisfy this requirement.
74. See text & accompnying notes 66-67 supra.
PURPOSES OF CIVIL COMMITMENT
deserved state attention by virtue of his own action.
Furthermore, requiring a recent dangerous act would provide
greater notice as to what behavior would subject an individual to
state control and would confine the discretion of state personnel
within reasonable and traditional limits. It would also enhance ju-
dicial supervision of the commitment process.
Requiring proof of recent dangerous acts might improve the
predictive ability of the experts. Though no empirical evidence is
available to establish this surmise conclusively, there seems to be a
consensus that one of the best indicators of future human behavior
is the past behavior of the individual. 5 Such a requirement would,
therefore, reduce the unacceptably large number of erroneous com-
mitments that now occur.
The ability of the experts to respond effectively and to take
steps to ameliorate a patient's condition would be enhanced by
such a requirement because of their better knowledge of the pre-
cise danger posed by the individual. And, perhaps the individual
himself would be more accepting of his confinement and amenable
to treatment if confronted with his specific recent behavior. This
increased amenability to treatment would also reduce the danger
posed by the individual.
Limiting police power commitments in this fashion may result
in some additional harm being inflicted by mentally ill persons on
themsleves or others that might otherwise not occur without such a
requirement. However, such harm would be more than offset by
eliminating the clearly established damage caused by mistakenly
committing a large number of individuals to mental health facili-
ties who do not in fact belong there.78
75. See Comment, Overt Dangerous Behavior, supra note 59.
76. Such calculations are empirical questions that are difficult to resolve by adequate
empirical inquiry. Some studies, however, do suggest that mentally ill persons are not as
dangerous as experts generally consider them to be. See notes 58-59 supra. On a purely
utilitarian calculus, a strong case can be made that restricting involuntary civil commitment
to cases of explicit dangerous conduct effects a net saving in harm (i.e., unnecessary loss of
liberty through inappropriate confinement minus harm actually committed by mentally ill
individuals not committed.). It may also be that most acts committed by the mentally ill
which cause serious harm are not sudden and without preparatory acts which would them-
selves satisfy the recent manifest act requirement set forth herein. See note 73 supra. If this
is the case, then the state might well have ample opportunity to intervene and to prevent
the ultimate harm anticipated. In any event, distributional justice is served since individuals
will not be committed until they have in fact engaged in behavior which causes harm and is
itself a valid basis for the loss of liberty.
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IV. AN EXAMINATION OF PARENS PATRIAE COMMITMENTS
A. Current Criticisms of Parens Patriae Commitments
The parens patriae commitment authority of the state has
been severely criticized over the past decade. In recent years, some
courts have struck down parens patriae commitment statutes be-
cause they are unconstitutionally vague. 7 In Goldy v. Beal,7 8 the
court concluded that Pennsylvania's Mental Health Act,79 which
permitted the state to involuntarily commit mentally ill persons
who needed care and treatment, was "unconstitutionally vague." 80
In particular, the court concluded that the statute did not provide
adequate and fair warning to individuals as to what conduct would
lead to an individual's commitment. Moreover, the statute, accord-
ing to the court, conferred too much discretion on persons charged
with administering the commitment scheme, thus inviting arbi-
trary and discriminatory enforcement.8 1
The logic of the court's holding in Goldy does not lead inexo-
rably to the conclusion that any parens patriae commitment
scheme is necessarily unconstitutional. Conceivably, the criteria for
commitment could be drawn with sufficient specificity so as to give
adequate notice and to confine administrative discretion within ac-
ceptable limits. Accordingly, cases which apply this particular con-
stitutional analysis do not necessarily vitiate the constitutionality
of the basic state objective sought to be advanced by parens pa-
triae commitment schemes under scrutiny. They simply require
the legislature to draft the commitment statutes with greater skill
and precision.
Occasionally a court will reach what is essentially a substan-
77. See Goldy v. Beal, 429 F. Supp. 640 (M.D. Pa. 1976); and Colyar v. Third Judicial
District Court, Etc., 469 F. Supp. 424 (D. Utah 1979).
78. 429 F. Supp. 640 (M.D. Pa. 1976).
79. § 406 of this statute permitted the state to commit indefinitely any person "in need
of care and treatment because of their mental disability." Id. at 646. § 102 defined "mental
disability," in part as "any mental illness, mental impairment, mental retardation, or mental
deficiency which so lessens the capacity of a person to use his customary self-control, judg-
ment and discretion in the conduct of his affairs and social relations as to make it necessary
or advisable for him to be under care... ." Id. at 647.
80. Id.
81. The court was influenced by the application of the "void for vagueness" doctrine in
the analogous criminal law context. It cited the Supreme Court's opinion in Papachristous v.
City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972), which struck down a city vagrancy ordinance as
overly vague.
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tive due process conclusion 2 by striking down a state commitment
scheme as vague and overly broad. Thus, in Colyar v. Third Judi-
cial District Court, Etc., 3 a federal district judge struck down as
unconstitutional a state statutory scheme that authorized involun-
tary civil commitment of an individual who is "mentally ill" and
"in need of custodial care or treatment in a mental health facility,
and because of illness . . . (i) lacks sufficient insight to make re-
sponsible decisions as to the need for care and treatment. .. ."
The court decided that this language was overly broad and vague
because it equated "inability to make a 'responsible' decision with
an unwillingness to follow through with treatment."8 5 It deter-
mined that this provision authorized commitment upon finding
that an individual refused to accept indicated treatment without
requiring the committing authority to ascertain whether that re-
fusal was the result of a "rational choice.""8 The court seemingly
determined that a person can make a rational decision if he can
"weigh the costs and benefits of commitment or treatments. '87 It
insisted that the primary inquiry of the committing authority
should be into the process of the individual's decision to. refuse
treatment, not into the wisdom or outcome of that decision.
82. See text & accompanying notes 94-100 infra.
83. 469 F. Supp. 424 (D. Utah 1979). Plaintiff was involuntarily committed under
Utah's statutory scheme even though the committing court specifically found that the pa-
tient "was not an immediate danger to himself or others and that he did not lack sufficient
capacity to provide himself with the basic necessities of life." Id. at 427. See also Lynch v.
Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974), rev'd, 651 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1981).
84. UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-7-36(6) (1978). The statute has since been amended. It per-
mits commitment if the court finds that the proposed patient is "mentally ill and a danger
to self or others" and because of this illness "[t]he patient lacks the ability to engage in a
rational decision-making process regarding the acceptance of mental treatment as demon-
strated by vidence of inability to weigh the possible costs and benefits of treatment. . .
UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-7-36(6) (Supp. 1979) (emphasis added).
85. 469 F. Supp. at 432.
86. Id. A very similar approach had previously been espoused by commentators. See
Developments-Civil Commitment, supra note 7, in which it was argued that incompetency
to make treatment decisions cannot be conclusively presumed from the presence of mental
illness since many forms of mental illness do not substantially impair reasoning or decision-
making capacity. Id. at 1214. Consequently, the authors urge that only those mentally ill
persons "who are incapable of evaluating the desireability of psychiatric care can constitu-
tionally be committed under the parens patriae power." Id. at 1215. These authors would
not limit such commitments to instances where the individual posed a serious threat of
physical harm to himself.
87. 469 F. Supp. at 433-34. It would be interesting to ascertain what sort of patient
insight would satisfy this legal standard.
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The court, however, went beyond its own analysis and con-
cluded that the state may involuntarily commit a mentally ill per-
son only if it first establishes that the person is a danger to him-
self.8 Only when the state has established that predicate fact is
the inability of a mentally ill person to take steps to ameliorate his
condition (i.e., his mental illness and its impact on his life) rele-
vant. In effect, the decision precluded the state from exercising its
traditional parens patriae authority and limited it to the exercise
of its police power.
As noted earlier, 9 courts had concluded in earlier cases that
protecting the community against harm from mentally ill persons
and providing care and treatment for such individuals were legiti-
mate state objectives and that involuntary commitment schemes
were rationally related to such purposes. Accordingly, these
schemes were invariably considered to be constitutional. Gradu-
ally, however, judicial emphasis has shifted from assessing the
state's specified objectives in enacting commitment legislation to
assessing the impact of such state action on the individual." There
is now a firm consensus that involuntary civil commitment results
in a substantial loss of liberty for an individual which may be of
indeterminate duration.2 Consequently, courts have concluded
88. Since the person was providing himself with the basic necessities of life, presumably
food, shelter and clothing, and was not suicidal, or likely to maim himself, the court con-
cluded that he posed no danger to himself. The court was influenced by dicta in Justice
Stewart's opinion which expressed grave doubt about the propriety of committing a men-
tally ill person who is not dangerous to himself and who can survive safely in freedom sim-
ply to raise his standard of living. Id. at 431.
89. See notes 17, 18 & 56 supra.
90. See, e.g., Prochaska v. Brinegar, 251 Iowa 834, 102 N.W.2d 870 (1960); Chavannes v.
Priestly, 80 Iowa 316, 45 N.W. 766 (1890); Darnell v. Cameron, 48 F.2d 64 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
91. See, e.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and re-
manded, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), order on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (1974), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), order reinstated on remand, 413 F. Supp.
1318 (1976).
92. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) and Developments-Civil Commit-
ment, supra note 7 at 1210-12. In addition to losing the freedom to come and go as he
pleases, an involuntary patient may suffer additional deprivation. For example, he may be
subjected to intrusive treatment, such as the administering of psychtropic drugs without his
consent. See Parham v. J.L. and J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). But see Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978) in which
the court held that involuntarily committed mental patients possessed a qualified right to
refuse psychotropic medication which requires certain due process procedures prior to the
forced administration of drugs; Cf. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1371 (D. Mass. 1979),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part and vacated and remanded, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980),
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that such a loss of liberty is a deprivation of a fundamental right
through state action which can only be justified upon a showing of
a compelling state interest.9 3
Under traditional Fourteenth Amendment substantive due
process analysis a state must demonstrate a compelling state inter-
est before it can substantially impair the fundamental rights of in-
dividuals through state action.9 Moreover, the means adopted to
further the state objective must be no broader than necessary to
accomplish the state interest.9 5 There can be little doubt that con-
finement in a mental health facility with the resulting loss of free-
dom constitutes a loss of liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment
of the Constitution. The almost total loss of personal autonomy
and its potentially indefinite duration are fairly drastic means to
achieve the state's goal.98
Recently, courts have been much less reluctant to evaluate the
validity of the stated objectives sought by mental health commit-
ments and to assess the constitutionality of such objectives and the
means adopted to achieve them. This increased willingness to ex-
amine basic assumptions underlying these statutory schemes and
to weigh on judicial scales the relative worth of the interests in-
volved has yielded inconsistent judicial results.
Some courts have concluded that parens patriae commit-
ments violate substantive due process because they do not further
a compelling state interest. They have reached this result with
minimal analysis and in a rather conclusory fashion.97 Other courts
vacated and remanded sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 50 U.S.L.W. 4676 (U.S. S. Ct. June 18,
1982) (involuntarily committed mental patients cannot be forcibly medicated except in
emergency circumstances).
93. It is not a facetious argument to assert that the liberty interest of a mentally ill
person unable to make rational choices concerning his life may not be deserving of the same
weight as the liberty interest of a fully rational individual. See Developments-Civil Com-
mitment, supra note 7. However, accurate fact-finding should establish this crucial fact.
There appears to be no overwhelming reason why the interest of the community in insuring
that all of its members have a realistic opportunity for meaningful participation in the com-
munity and the individual's own interest in having his capacity to act rationally in his own
behalf safeguarded cannot be considered as a "compelling state interest" under current con-
stitutional analysis. See text & accompanying notes 137-40 infra.
94. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
95. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (Privacy), Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969) (Equal Protection); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (Free Exercise
of Religion).
96. The same observation is applicable to police power commitments.
97. See, e.g., Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F. Supp. 509 (D. Neb. 1975) in which the court, in
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have upheld the constitutionality of a state's exercise of its parens
patriae power.98 Such commitments, in addition to benefiting the
individual, were considered to further general societal interests ei-
ther by protecting the community from potentially dangerous indi-
viduals or by restoring a person as a productive member of soci-
ety.99 These conclusions, like those of the courts which reached the
opposite result,100 are supported by minimal evidence and analysis.
There have been other criticisms of parens patriae commit-
ments. Each has influenced to a varying degree the emerging atti-
tude of resistance to these commitments. Some critics have alleged
that involuntary commitment of persons to a mental health facility
is merely a subterfuge for controlling the behavior of individuals
whom society will not tolerate.101 This view of parens patriae as
serving the distasteful social engineering task of reinforcing
majoritarian values has influenced some courts. In Doremus v. Far-
rell,10 2 the court, in striking down Nebraska's parens patriae com-
mitment scheme, stated:
To permit involuntary civil commitment on a finding of mental illness and
the need for treatment alone would be tantamount to condoning the State's
commitment of persons deemed socially undesirable for the purposes of in-
doctrinating or conforming the individual's beliefs to the beliefs of the
state.
101
The court neglected to demonstrate with substantiating evidence
its conclusion that the purpose of the Nebraska scheme in theory
striking down a Nebraska statute which permitted the state to commit mentally ill persons
in need of treatment, said simply:
Considering the fundamental rights involved in civil commitment, the parens
patriae power must require a compelling interest of the state to justify the dep-
rivation of liberty. In the mental health field, where diagnosis and treatment are
uncertain, the need for treatment without some degree of imminent harm to the
person or dangerousness to society is not a compelling justification.
Id. at 514.
The court did not clarify whether it considered diagnosis too uncertain or the objective
of treatment too uncertain or both. If diagnosis is too uncertain, then arguably police power
commitment is also unconstitutional since it also requires a diagnosis of mental illness.
98. See, e.g., People v. Sansone, 18 IlM. App. 3d 315, 309 N.E.2d 733 (1974), leave to
appeal denied, 56 IMI. 2d 584 (1974); In re Valdez, 88 N.M. 338, 540 P.2d 818 (1974).
99. In re Valdez, 88 N.M. at 342, 540 P.2d at 822.
100. See note 97 supra.
101. Szasz is probably the most prolific and strident critic espousing this view. See gen-
erally, T. SzASz, PSYCHIATRIC JUSTiCE (1965).
102. 407 F. Supp. 509 (D. Neb. 1975).
103. Id. at 514.
PURPOSES OF CIVIL COMMITMENT
or as applied to the particular case before it was to insure the so-
cial conformity of citizens.'"
This concern also influenced the Supreme Court in Donaldson
v. O'Connor,1 0 5 the only case in which the Supreme Court ex-
amined at any length the constitutionality of the state objectives
purportedly served by state commitment schemes. In Donaldson,
the Court held that depriving a mentally ill individual of his lib-
erty pursuant to a state involuntary commitment statute for the
purpose of providing him with treatment and then failing to pro-
vide any treatment to that person during confinement violated his
constitutional rights.1 In essence, the Court concluded that the
state had made no attempt to accomplish the purported purpose of
the confinement. The Court explicitly avoided deciding whether a
parens patriae commitment for treatment or for a custodial pur-
pose was constitutionally permissible. 0 7 There is, therefore, no Su-
preme Court case which explicitly precludes the exercise by gov-
ernment of its parens patriae authority for the purpose of
affording treatment to mentally ill individuals who are not danger-
ous to others or to themselves.10 8 Justice Stewart, in dicta, stated
that the state may not commit persons simply to homogenize soci-
ety or to protect the sensibilities of the majority. He said:
May the State fence in the harmless mentally ill solely to save its citizens
from exposure to those whose ways are different? One might as well ask if the
State, to avoid public unease, could incarcerate all who are physically unat-
tractive or socially eccentric. Mere public intolerance or animosity cannot
constitutionally justify the deprivation of a person's physical liberty.10
104. The court did relate briefly the case history of one of the involuntary patients who
initiated the litigation. It hardly justified the court's general conclusion concerning the pur-
pose of such commitments.
105. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
106. Id. at 575-76.
107. Id. at 575. Here Justice Stewart stated:
We need not decide whether, when or by what procedures, a mentally ill person
may be confined by the state on any of the grounds which, under contemporary
statutes are generally advanced to justify involuntary confinement of such a per-
son-to prevent injury to the public, to insure his own survival or safety,.., or
to alleviate or cure his illness.
108. Id.
109. Despite dicta in Donaldson which indicates skepticism concerning the constitu-
tionality of parens patriae commitments, the holding of the case may implicitly affirm that
the state may constitutionally exercise its parens patriae authority for a therapeutic pur-
pose. Specifically, the Court could have reached the same result as it did simply by holding
that the parens patriae ground under which Kenneth Donaldson was committed-mental
1981]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Other critics contend that mental illness is either not an em-
pirical reality,11 or if it is, that the science of identifying and treat-
ing mental illness is too inaccurate to form a permissible basis for
the loss of individual liberty."' Ennis and Litwack, after an exten-
sive review of the professional literature, argue that psychiatric
Judgments (in particular, psychiatric evaluations and predictions)
are unreliable 112 and invalid."' They argue that mental health pro-
fessionals do not attain a sufficient degree of agreement among
themselves in diagnosing mental illness and that, in any event, the
purported diagnosis by a mental health professional simply does
not describe accurately the empirical reality of the patient's condi-
tion. Since the necessary expertise of mental health professionals is
lacking, Ennis and Litwack argue that courts ought not to receive
such evidence into commitment proceedings.
14
More importantly, these authors suggest that the lack of con-
sistency among diagnoses may well induce inaccurate fact-finding
and thus result in an unacceptable rate of "false positives;" per-
sons who are not mentally ill and/or do not need treatmen who
are, nonetheless, committed mistakenly. 15 In short, these critics
are concerned that the therapeutic net thrown by involuntary civil
commitment will catch too many persons who do not in fact satisfy
the commitment criteria.
Some critics have decried the open-ended delegation to, and
occasional usurpation by, experts of control over individual liberty
which results from involuntary civil commitment for a therapeutic
purpose.1 6 The significant influence of experts together with the
indeterminate duration of this type of commitment 17 has gener-
illness and his alleged need for treatment-was an impermissible exercise of the state's au-
thority. The Court, however, did not base its decision on this ground. Id. at 567.
110. Perhaps the most vocal opponent of accepting mental illness as an empirical real-
ity is Thomas Szasz. See, e.g., Szasz, The Myth of Mental Illness, 15 AM. PsYcH. 113 (1960).
111. See Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and Expertise, supra note 49.
112. By "reliable" Ennis & Litwack mean that "other psychiatrists would agree with
those conclusions." Id. at 695.
113. By "valid" these authors mean that their evaluations accurately reflect reality. Id.
114. The authors argue, in effect, that this evidence is not entitled to be characterized
as "expert" and should not, therefore, be given special status in commitment proceedings.
Id. at 694-95.
115. See generally Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and Expertise, supra note 49.
116. See, e.g., Dershowitz, Psychiatry in the Legal Process: A Knife That Cuts Both
Ways in THE PATH OF THE LAW FROM 1967 (A. Sutherland ed. 1968).
117. Under the traditional parens patriae power, the state is authorized to confine an
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ated apprehension that the courts are not really capable of super-
vising the institutionalization process.11
Another cause for concern is the tendency of some mental
health professionals or committing authorities to disregard the as-
serted refusal of a mentally ill person to accept treatment. Mental
health professionals occasionally claim that the true message con-
tained in the refusal is a hidden plea for aid.1 9 Courts conclude on
occasion that such a refusal must be irrational because treatment
appears to be urgently required.
There is also concern that the states simply do not allocate
adequate resources to achieve the purposes of parens patriae com-
mitments; namely, reasonable care and treatment of mental illness.
Various courts have addressed this problem by invoking the doc-
trine of a "right to treatment" in order to require states to provide
adequate treatment.120 The Donaldson case can be read as af-
firming that a person involuntarily committed for treatment is
individual for as long as the person is mentally in and needs care or treatment. There is, at
the moment, no outer limit set on the duration of confinement. See note 62 supra. In Jack-
son v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), the Court concluded that "due process requires that the
nature and duration of commitment [here the commitment of a mentally defective deaf
mute determined to be incompetent to stand trial] bear some reasonable relation to the
purpose for which the individual is committed." Id. at 738.
118. The facts of Donaldson present a rather severe example of how an individual can
be confined by experts without effective judicial supervision or redress. Kenneth Donaldson
was confined in a mental health facility against his will for 15 years even though he was not
dangerous to himself or to others, could survive adequately on his own, was not receiving
treatment and could have been placed with individuals or institutions which would have
provided him with care, supervision and treatment. He was unable to obtain effective judi-
cial redress during that entire period. 422 U.S. at 563, 65. For another graphic example of
abuse by experts, see U.S. ex rel. Schuster v. Harold, 410 F.2d 1071 (2d Cir. 1969), appeal
dismissed, 440 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir. 1971).
119. See, e.g., Chodoff, The Case for Involuntary Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill,
133 AM. J. PsYcH. 496 (1967). The author, in arguing for parens patriae commitment of
severely mentally ill persons in need of treatment, states that "[t]heir verbal message that
they will not accept treatment may at the same time be conveying more covert messages--
that they are desperate and want help even though they cannot ask for it." Id. at 498. See
also Katz, The Right to Treatment-an Enchanting Legal Fiction, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 755
(1969). But see Colyar v. Third Judicial District Court, Etc., 469 F. Supp. 424 (D. Utah
1979) (The court intelligently insisted that the proper focus is on the process whereby the
patient makes his decision and not on its content or on the merits of the decision as per-
ceived by the mental health professional or by the court.).
120. 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972). In Wyatt, the court set forth objective resource
standards which specified "minimum Constitutional standards for adequate treatment of
the mentally ill." Id. at 379.
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constitutionally entitled to some minimum level of treatment.121
But the Supreme Court also rejected in no uncertain terms the
right to treatment rationale enunciated by the Circuit Court in the
decision below.122 Thus, it is clear that at this moment there is no
affirmative constitutional right to treatment for mentally ill indi-
viduals who need therapeutic help. Of course, the costs of provid-
ing adequate care and treatment may militate in favor of abolish-
ing parens patriae commitments. Many states have initiated
programs designed to reduce drastically the population of their
mental health facilities.123
The movement to abolish parens patriae commitment is gain-
ing strength. Some states have revised their commitment statutes
so as to eliminate such commitments entirely. 2  And, as men-
tioned earlier, some courts have concluded that such commitments
are constitutionally impermissible.125
Courts which have struck down parens patriae involuntary
commitment schemes invariably postulate individual liberty as a
superior value whenever balanced against the interests of the
state. 1 28 Commentators 127 who agree with such judicial invalidation
of the power of the state to coercively treat those mentally ill indi-
viduals unable to help themselves seem to fix upon John Stuart
Mill as having stated their case best:
121. Because there was substantial agreement that the plaintiff received virtually no
treatment during his confinement, the Court in Donaldson was not faced with the difficult
question of how much treatment satisfies the minimal constitutional imperative. 422 U.S. at
574.
122. Id. at 572-73.
123. Beginning in the 1950's mental institutions began extensive and systematic use of
tranquilizers which would minimize anti-social behavior and allow patients to function ade-
quately outside mental health institutions. This treatment made possible wholesale dis-
charge of patients and resulted in thousands of chronically mentally ill patients being re-
leased from state hospitals into dilapidated quarters in neighborhoods reluctant to accept
them. A population of 550,000 in state mental hospitals in 1955 had been reduced to 190,000
by 1978. N.Y. Times, May 21, 1978, § 6 (Magazine), at 17. For an interesting account of how
de-institutionalized mental health patients survive, see N.Y. Times, May 21, 1978, § 6 (Mag-
azine), at 14. Critics of wholesale release of such patients from mental health facilities char-
acterize such de-institutionalization as "dumping." See also Mental Health System Act of
1979: Hearings on § 1177 Before the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1979) (statement of Secretary Joseph A. Califano).
124. See note 84 supra.
125. See notes 80 and 83 supra.
126. See note 83 supra.
127. See, e.g., note 1 supra.
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The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good
in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or
impede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the proper guardian of his own
health, whether bodily or mental and spiritual. Mankind are greater gainers
by suffering each other to live as seems good to themselves, than by compel-
ling each to live as seems good to the rest.125
As an abstract proposition, it may be difficult to disagree with
Mill's paean to self-determination as the ultimate social value.
However, it seems callous to ignore the effect mental illness can
have on the quality of human liberty and on the ability to pursue
one's own good. A mentally ill individual may suffer from extreme
emotional disturbance such as acute anxiety or depression.29
Mental illness can also result in acute impairment of an individ-
ual's cognitive and volitional capacities, substantially limiting a
person's ability to pursue his own good.130 Without concern for the
actual quality of liberty enjoyed by mentally ill persons and their
capacity to choose from among alternatives, abstract statements of
the relative values of "freedom" and "loss of liberty" may be of
minimal legal significance.3 1 Indeed, in particular cases, Mill's ax-
iom that every person should always pursue his own good without
interference may be a condemnation to a life of severe deprivation
and suffering without any prospect for self-initiated change.
128. J. MILL, ON LmERTY 18 (Regney ed. 1955).
129. Commentators arguing in favor of involuntary civil commitment frequently discuss
in anecdotal style individual case histories of persons who are mentally ill and suffering
severely from their illnesses. See, e.g., the case histories described in Chodoff, The Case for
Involuntary Hospitalization, 133 AM. J. PSYCH. 496 (1967), and Slovenko, Civil Commit-
ment in Perspective, 20 J. Pun. L. 3, 19-20. For a well reasoned theoretical argument on
behalf of limited coercive treatment of the mentally ill, see Katz, The Right to Treat-
ment-An Enchanting Legal Fiction, 36 U. Cm. L. REv. 755 (1969).
130. For an interesting perspective on persons (many of whom may be mentally ill) who
live in rather stark conditions, see Beck & Marden, Street Dwellers, NATURAL HISTORY, VOL.
86 No. 9, (1977). This article describes persons who live on the streets of New York City,
including "bag ladies" who carry all of their possessions in shopping bags, forage in garbage
cans for food and frequently reside in public buildings.
131. This debate over relative values may be resolved adequately by devising a commit-
ment scheme that in close cases resolves uncertainty in favor of liberty. This can be accom-
plished by using appropriate standards and procedures. Abolishing parens patriae commit-
ment in effect creates a conclusive presumption in favor of liberty without regard to its
quality or to the countervailing state interests. Coercive intervention in the lives of mentally
ill persons who have substantially reduced capacity for rational choice may also enhance
"freedom." Gerald Dworkin argues that "Paternalism is justified only to preserve a wider
range of freedom for the individual in question." See Dworkin, Paternalism, in MoRALrry
AND THE LAW 107 (R.A. Wasserstrom ed. 1971).
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B. Recommendations
Coercive intervention in the lives of mentally ill persons for an
essentially therapeutic purpose is a permissible state objective
when mental illness has so severely affected the individual that he
is no longer capable of making a rational choice as to whether to
continue in his present state or to seek treatment for his mental
illness. This principle is, of course, not a novel proposition.
Courts,3 2 legislatures, 3  and commentators3  have considered
state intervention in such situations to be both a humane and per-
missible state objective despite the loss of liberty resulting from
such state action. Though some critics have disputed the propriety
of even commitments which are truly therapeutic, 35 most critics
are concerned that the parens patriae authority of the state is
presently used to impose choices on individuals who are in fact ca-
pable of making sufficiently autonomous and rational choices. 1 6
Authorizing the state to act coercively in these circumstances
raises the problem of paternalism and requires philosophical justi-
fication. The primary argument in favor of such state paternalism
is that of implied consent. That is, each of us impliedly authorizes
the state to act on our behalf should we become too incapacitated
to act in our own self-interest. Some philosophers have considered
that each of us has given this implied consent prospectively. Rawls,
for example, argues that each of us in the "original position" 137
would acknowledge that others could act for us, even against our
expressed wishes, if we lacked the capacity to act rationally for our
own good.1 38 There is some anecdotal evidence that substantiates
this philosophical justification. Psychiatrists and commentators in-
dicate that many patients who refused treatment are subsequently
grateful for being involuntarily hospitilized after treatment has re-
stored their rationality.13 9 In effect, some of those committed sub-
132. See notes 90 and 99 supra.
133. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 5001, 5122 and FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.367
(West).
134. See, e.g., Developments-Civil Commitment, supra note 7, at 1212-19.
135. See note 1 supra.
136. See Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, On Justifications, supra note 25 at 87-88.
137. By the "original position" Rawls means a position in which individuals must
choose principles of associaton ignorant of their specific characteristics and position within
the group. J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 17-22 (1971).
138. Id. at 248-51.
139. See Slovenko, Civil Commitment in Perspective, 20 J. PUB. L. 3, 19-23 (1971).
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sequently acknowledged that their prior incapacitated condition
justified the state's ignoring their refusal of treatment. These pa-
tients, in effect, have given their consent retroactively.140
Put in simple terms, would most citizens wish to live in a soci-
ety which was absolutely powerless to act in their own best interest
should they become unable to do so themselves because of mental
illness? Though there appears to be no empirical data as to soci-
ety's feelings, one intuitively senses that this question would be
answered overwhelmingly in the negative. Simple prudence indi-
cates that most individuals would wish for assistance should they
become gravely incapacitated.
The state objectives sought to be furthered by parens patriae
commitment schemes ought to be compatible with their philosoph-
ical justification. In order to insure that this is so, the standards
for therapeutic commitment by the state under its parens patriae
authority must be refined and narrowed so as to indicate quite
clearly that only those mentally ill persons who need treatment
and as a result of their illness are incapable of exercising a rational
choice between seeking treatment or continuing in their present
situations would be amenable to coercive commitment. At the very
least, persons whose cognitive ability is so impaired by mental ill-
ness as to render them unable to perceive the essential symptoms
of their illness, the significant impact it has on their lives, the
treatment alternatives available to them, and the relative costs and
benefits of such treatment ought to be amenable to coercive civil
commitment.1 4 1 Such individuals simply are not able-to assess ra-
140. This concept is analogous to what Gerald Dworkin terms "parental paternalism."
See Dworkin, Paternalism, in MoRALrrY AND THE LAW 107 (R.A. Wasserstrom ed. 1971). He
states that:
Parental paternalism may be thought of as a wager by a parent on a child's
subsequent recognition of the wisdom of the restrictions. There is an emphasis
on what would be called future-oriented consent-on what the child will come to
welcome, rather than on what he does welcome.
Id. at 119.
141. Whether persons whose affective or volitional capacities are impaired by mental
illness so as to preclude the exercise of treatment choice ought also to be amenable to coer-
cive commitment is a more difficult question. If they possess relevant knowledge of the na-
ture of their incapacity and know it may dramatically affect their decision, then perhaps
their refusal to accept treatment should be respected. At the very least it can be cogently
argued that relevant knowledge is a necessary and indispensable condition for meaningful
choice. Washington considers severe volitional impairment resulting from mental illness
which threatens the health of the individual as a sufficient ground for involuntary civil com-
mitment. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.05.020 (Supp. 1979). Permitting mentally ill per-
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tionally the choices available to them or to seek their own best in-
terest. Just as it makes no sense to conclusively presume incompe-
tence from mental illness, it also makes no sense to conclusively
presume that all mentally ill persons are competent to pursue their
own best interest in a rational manner. Insuring that its citizens
have a minimal opportunity to asert their human autonomy and
freedom in a rational and meaningful fashion should be recognized
as a compelling state interest justifying the use of the state's power
of coercion.
Statutory criteria for parens patriae commitments which fo-
cus on the incapacity of a mentally ill person to make competent
treatment decisions should be constitutionally acceptable. An ex-
clusive formulation of such criteria should be avoided lest it im-
pede the development of clear and appropriately circumscribed
standards which can evolve in light of empirical knowledge. Sev-
eral states have adopted, at one time or another, standards which
seem to satisfy this general criterion. Delaware has enacted a stat-
utory formulation which would permit hospitalization of a men-
tally ill individual who is "unable to make responsible decisions
with respect to his hospitalization. 1 4 2 Such a formulation poses
some risk that any patient decision which differed from that rec-
ommended by a mental health professional is by definition "irre-
sponsible." However, if this standard is construed to focus on the
process of decision-making by the patient based on his possession
of relevant knowledge, it should be an acceptable statutory
formulation.
sons to be treated against their expressed wishes because of volitional or affective impair-
ment may permit treatment personnel to characterize a patient's express refusal of
treatment based on the possession of relevant knowledge as a symptom manifesting voli-
tional or affective disability which would itself justify commitment. Standards should be
drawn so as to minimize the opportunity for circular reasoning or for redefining the content
of human communication. See notes 25 and 119 supra. This issue-whether volitional inca-
pacity caused by mental illness should also support coercive commitment-parallels the de-
bate in the insanity defense. The A.L.I. insanity defense permits substantial volitional im-
pairment resulting from mental illness to excuse a person from criminal responsibility while
the traditional M'Naghten test does not. For a recent discussion resolving this debate in
favor of the A.L.I. test, see People v. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d 333, 583 P.2d 1318, 149 Cal. Rptr. 275
(1978). Feinberg would limit coercive intervention into the lives of the mentally ill to cases
in which mental illness causes cognitive impairment. He would not permit such intervention
if mental illness causes only emotional or volitional disability. See J. FEINBERG, What is so
Special About Mental Illness?, in DOING AND DESERVING (1970).
142. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 5001, 5003 (Supp. 1980).
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Missouri had at one time adopted commitment criteria which
are preferable and should clearly be considered constitutional.
This scheme permitted coercive confinement of any one who was
"mentally ill and in need of care or treatment in a mental hospital,
and because of his illness lacked sufficient insight or capacity to
make a rational treatment choice."14 Presumably, this standard
would require a mental health professional to ascertain the compe-
tency of an individual to make a rational treatment choice. Invol-
untary commitment would not be permitted under this scheme un-
less the professional could demonstrate to the committing
authority the specific manner in which a patient lacked relevant
insight or capacity for rational choice.
Some states are now requiring the commitment authorities to
demonstrate that a patient poses a serious threat of physical harm
to himself if he is not treated before commitment for treatment is
permitted.14 4 Thus, Arizona currently requires the state to show
that a mentally ill person's physical condition has severly deterio-
rated due to an inability to provide the basic life supports of food,
clothing, or shelter.145 Such a scheme is extremely harsh in that it
appears to define mental competency to make arational treatment
decision exclusively in terms of physical condition. Not only does it
seem to focus solely on the incorrect legal concern-physical well-
being rather than competency to make a treatment decision-but
it also increases the risk to the patient by postponing coercive state
intervention until the stakes are extraordinarily high. Not only
must a patient's mental health be gravely impaired, but his very
life must also be substantially at risk.
It is not that difficult to identify persons who might fall within
appropriately drawn standards. Psychotic individuals who are out
of touch with reality would usually qualify since they are generally
not aware of their mental illness, are frequently not functionally
relating to their environment or to persons in their environment,
and are usually not aware of treatment alternatives available to
143. Mo. REv. STAT. § 202.123 (repealed 1955 Mo. Laws, p.656, § A). It permitted invol-
untary civil commitment of persons who are "mentally ill,. . . in need of treatment in a
mental hospital, and because of. . .illness lacks sufficient insight or capacity to make re-
sponsible application therefore." See Mo. REv. STAT. § 202.797 (repealed 1978 Mo. Laws p.
511, § 2).
144. See, e.g., IDAHo CODE §§ 66.317, .329 (Supp. 1981).
145. Am. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-501, 36-520 (Supp. 1981-82).
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them.146 It is also possible to identify mentally ill persons who
would not fall within the reach of this commitment standard. Per-
sons who are aware of their symptoms and the impact their illness
may have on the quality of their lives and are also aware of treat-
ment alternatives, including the risks and benefits of such alterna-
tives, would not satisfy the criteria for commitment. 147 Such per-
sons have sufficient insight into their condition and into ways to
change it if they so desire and, consequently, their exercise of per-
sonal autonomy ought to be respected.
Substantive due process requires that the state in fact have
the ability to achieve its specified purpose. 48 Thus, the state, in
confining individuals against their will for treatment purposes,
must be able to demonstrate that appropriate and effective treat-
ment is available to achieve that objective. 49 Presently, the psychi-
atric profession appears to possess sufficient treatment expertise to
afford most persons who would be subject to commitment pursu-
ant to this proposed model a reasonable chance to attain the ca-
pacity for making rational treatment choices. 50 The criteria for
commitment should, therefore, also require the state to make a
preliminary showing, after an initial diagnosis, that effective treat-
ment is in fact available for the person whose involuntary commit-
ment is sought. 51 This would help insure that, before a person suf-
fers a loss of liberty, there is a reasonable prospect that the state's
146. See generally THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR: PSYCHOLOGY, PSYCHIATRY,
AND MENTAL HEALTH 1078-79 (R. Goldenson ed. 1970); F. REDLICH & D. FREEDMAN, THE
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY 252-53 (1966); DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 367-68 (3d ed. 1980).
147. See Developments-Civil Commitment, supra note 7, at 1212-14. For an interest-
ing case of this type see the case history of Quinton Roger Adams in Ennis, C. L. U. CLI-
ENT "Crazy But Competent" in LAw, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 334
(1974). Compare Lake v. Cameron, 364 F. 2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Such persons might well
be encouraged to seek therapy and treatment voluntarily. But see Note, District of Colum-
bia Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Act, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1062 (1965).
148. See text & accompanying notes 94-98 supra.
149. Cf. DuBose, Parens Patriae Commitment, supra note 6, at 1153 (The author con-
cludes that whether the state can in fact afford the required efficacious treatment depends
on whether the proffered treatment will benefit the patient, what percentage of a treated
sample will improve, the degree of improvement and the danger, if any, to the patient from
the proposed treatment.).
150. See, e.g., Davis, Recent Developments in the Treatment of Schizophrenia, 6
PSYCH. ANN. 33 (1976). But see DuBose, Parens Patriae Commitment, supra note 6.
151. A tentative diagnosis should be required as well as a statement of which treatment
is preliminarily indicated by the diagnosis.
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purported objective-the restoration of rational choice-can be
achieved. 152 Requiring an initial showing that the indicated treat-
ment is available and is reasonably likely to succeed would also
inject more visibility into the treatment process conducted by
treatment professionals, thereby enhancing the ability of the
courts to effectively monitor and review the appropriateness and
progress of treatment. It would also provide a more timely oppor-
tunity for courts to impose limitations on treatment modalities.
153
Most parens patriae statutory commitment schemes which
permit involuntary confinement of mentally ill persons generally
do not set limits on permissible treatment objectives.5 4 Rather,
the implicit permissible objective of such schemes invariably is to
make the patient "well. ' 155 In fact, once a person is determined to
lack the competence to make rational treatment decisions, most
such schemes simply substitute the judgment of a surrogate deci-
sion-maker (usually a mental health professional) to make such de-
cisions as he deems will serve a patient's best interest in obtaining
full recovery. Consequently, wide discretion has frequently been
accorded treatment personnel. This discretion includes not only
152. Donaldson indicated that some treatment effort was constitutionally required
under a parens patriae treatment rationale though it did not indicate whether such treat-
ment had to be effective.
153. Recently, some federal courts have held that involuntarily committed patients
have a constitutional right to refuse medication in non-emergency situations. Rennie v.
Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978) and Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass.
1979), affld in part and rev'd in part, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded
sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 50 U.S.L.W. 4676 (U.S. S. Ct. June 18, 1982). It makes more sense
to determine at the outset whether effective treatment is probably available and whether
the state may, subject to broad limitations, be able to choose the treatment best suited to
the patient's illness including psychotropic medication. It would be a fruitless expenditure
of time and effort to permit involuntary commitment for treatment purposes but then de-
termine that a patient may refuse even indicated and effective medication.
154. Most statutory schemes set limits on treatment modalities. Thus, for example, ex-
ceptionally intrusive treatment modalities such as electroschock or psychosurgery are either
not permitted or can be administered only in exceptional instances and in compliance with
stringent procedural and substantive safeguards. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §
71.05.370(7).
155. Very few parens patriae statutes specify with substantial particularity the objec-
tive of such commitments. Many of the schemes simply require or permit periodic judicial
review to ascertain if the patient is still committable: i.e., if he still satisfies the criteria for
initial commitment set forth in the statutory scheme. See Note, Procedural Safeguards for
Periodic Review: A New Comitment to Mental Patients' Rights, 88 YALE L.J. 850 (1979).
These schemes typically do not require immediate release once 4 person's condition im-
proves sufficiently so as to take the individual out of the class which qualifies for initial
commitment.
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what treatment modality will be attempted, " ' but also (and per-
haps more importantly) when the tacitly understood treatment ob-
jective of full recovery has been achieved. Put differently, treat-
ment personnel are frequently permitted to determine, usually
subject to periodic administrative or judicial review, s when a pa-
tient is well enough to be released. As a consequence, a patient
might be committed because he is unable to make rational treat-
ment decisions but continue in confinement without his consent
even after initial treatment has restored his capacity for rational
choice.
The treatment objective, and thus the administration of a spe-
cific treatment modality, should be limited to the goal of restoring
an individual's capacity for making rational treatment decisions.
Such a limitation would insure that the "nature and duration of
the confinement" is in fact compatible with the legitimate purpose
of parens patriae commitment.115 Moreover, it would require that
treatment have as its objective not complete restoration to full
mental health of the patient as determined by mental health pro-
fessionals, but rather the restoration of the patient's capacity to
engage in rational choice.
This limitation would also help insure that the means em-
ployed by the state to accomplish a legitimate objective are no
broader than necessary, thereby complying with an important re-
quirement of substantive due process.159 Once sufficient autonomy
has been restored, a patient would be free to terminate hospitaliza-
tion or, if he chooses, to continue treatment as a voluntary pa-
tient.18 0 Such a model would eliminate the arbitrary substitution of
the treatment professional's values or society's values for those of
the individual being treated, thereby meeting the criticism of some
156. This may include, for example, milieu therapy, medication, psycho-therapy, and
other forms of recognized mental health treatment.
157. See Note, Procedural Safeguards for Periodic Review, supra note 155.
158. See notes 62 and 117 supra.
159. See text & accompanying notes 92-93 supra.
160. Safeguards may be required to insure that undue influence is not used by treat-
ment personnel to coerce patients to stay in the facility on a "voluntary" status. There is
some basis for such concern. See Gilboy and Schmidt, "Voluntary" Hospitalization of the
Mentally Ill, 66 Nw. U. L. REV. 429 (1971) and In re Buttonow, 23 N.Y.2d 385, 244, N.E.2d
677 (1968). These safeguards might include, for example, mandatory release with reapplica-
tion required or that a change in status be accomplished only after a patient has been able
to consult with counsel.
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courts161 and commentators.162 This scheme would also enable an
individual to make a rational decision concerning the quality of his
individual liberty. He would be aware of his condition and of op-
portunities to change it if he so desired. He would not simply be
conclusively presumed to have chosen his present environment,
lifestyle and condition.
An absolute limit should be set on the period during which the
state could retain an involuntary patient. 6 3 This maximum reten-
tion period should probably not exceed thirty days though it might
be adjusted in light of additional empirical data.164 A limit should
also be set on the frequency of such coercive intervention. At a
minimum six months should have elapsed from a prior commit-
ment before an individual could be subjected to subsequent com-
mitment proceedings. This would insure that the mental health in-
voluntary commitment system does not become a "revolving door"
which would undermine the objectives of the model.
The proposed commitment model would have significant ad-
vantages over most parens patriae schemes currently in effect.
Most importantly, it would assure congruence between the justifi-
cation for such state action and its implementation. Also, the nar-
row criteria for commitment would provide specificity in delineat-
ing the class of individuals subject to commitment, give clear
"notice," and limit substantially the discretion of persons adminis-
tering the scheme.6 5 In addition, the standards would permit more
intelligent and careful judicial review of administrative decisions.
No longer would courts have to "second-guess" a mental health
professional's decision as to what is in the best interests of the
committed individual. Essentially, the court would inquire as to
whether a mentally ill individual was in fact rationally aware of his
161. See note 103 supra.
162. See generally Livermore, Malquist & Meehl, On Justifications, supra note 25.
163. Judicial review during the initial confinement period should be available prior to
the expiration of such period. While virtually all states allow the patient to petition for a
review of his status by institutional authorities, only a handful allow for a judicial review.
See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-546 (Supp. 1981-82); IDAHO CODE § 66-343 (Supp.
1981); IOWA CODE ANN. § 229.22 (West Supp. 1981-82); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1482.
164. Setting any maximum retention period involves a degree of arbitrary line-drawing.
Future empirical data may suggest that in most cases restoring a mentally ill person's capac-
ity for rational choice can generally be accomplished within a specified time period.
165. See text & accompanying notes 116-18 supra. The discretion as to who should be




condition and of choices available to him which might change it if
he so desired."' 6
This model would also reduce substantially the ratio of false
positives; the number of individuals who are mistakenly swept into
the mental health system. The commitment criteria are applicable
to a smaller number of individuals and the incapacity which satis-
fies the criteria is relatively pronounced. Since fewer persons can
be committed under this scheme and since retention of such per-
sons within the system is to be of limited frequency and duration,
the scheme should increase the likelihood that adequate treatment
resources are, in fact, made available to persons who lose their lib-
erty on the implied promise of effective treatment.167
This parens patriae commitment model would be an appro-
priately limited state response to the present factual reality of pa-
tients' conditions and their current disability. Unlike many current
police power commitment models, it is not a state response to the
mere possibility of dangerous future conduct. Moreover, psychiat-
ric expertise would be used in an appropriate manner by the legal
system. The essential expertise of psychiatrists consists of diagnos-
ing and treating mental illness as it presents itself, not of predict-
ing future dangerous behavior.
Requiring the state at the outset of the commitment process
to indicate a tentative diagnosis and to demonstrate that effective
treatment is available improves the ability of courts to exercise
meaningful and timely judicial control over the detention and
treatment phase of the process."6 " The permissible treatment ob-
jective is limited to restoring a person's ability to engage in auton-
omous decision-making in a manner that is consistent with tradi-
tional and meaningful concepts of freedom and liberty. The
limited duration and frequency of state intervention would en-
courage respect for individual autonomy and would sensitize treat-
166. A judge might well be able to ascertain whether the individual is capable of exer-
cising such choice by questioning him personally.
167. It is possible, of course, that the proposed model would result in the confinement
of only the most severly mentally ill and that, consequently, the advantages achieved by
allocating the presently available resources to fewer individuals would be offset by the sever-
ity and intractability of the mental illness being treated.
168. Since the coercive power of the state is being exercised by treatment personnel
under authority delegated by the state, effective judicial control of this phase is especially
imperative yet often neglected.
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ment personnel to their appropriate roles and objectives in the
process.
CONCLUSION
There is legitimate concern as to whether coercive psychiatric
intervention by the state in the lives of its mentally ill citizens
should be tolerated either to protect the community or an individ-
ual from harm, or to help an individual unable to help himself.
Many courts and legislatures, applauded by many commentators,
would resolve this doubt by permitting police power commitments
of the mentally ill upon a minimal claim of dangerousness while
not permitting parens patriae commitments which have a thera-
peutic purpose. A better resolution is to permit both types of in-
voluntary civil commitments under the narrow commitment crite-
ria suggested herein. This would permit the state to protect the
community from those mentally ill citizens who pose a substantial
risk of serious harm to themselves or others and whose own con-
duct merits such state intervention. Moreover, the state would not
be forced to abandon many citizens afflicted with serious mental
illness to a lifetime of abject suffering based on a conclusive pre-
sumption of rational choice. Surely such an alternative parens pa-
triae model should be tried before taking the drastic step of abol-
ishing the power. In short, the commitment scheme herein
proposed would insure that compelling state objectives would be
furthered by carefully crafted means that afford a very reasonable
prospect of accomplishing legitimate and humane state purposes.
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